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Business Visibility and Taxation in 
Northern Cameroon
José-María Muñoz
Abstract: Through an analysis of the taxation of business activities in Adamaoua 
Province, Cameroon, this article aims to provide ethnographic substance to current 
debates about the “tax effort” in sub-Saharan Africa. Although the current mission 
of the tax authorities to identify all potential taxpayers and track their locations, 
movements, and activities is often presented in the context of nationwide reform 
and a commitment to making all taxable enterprises visible, a close examination of 
the government’s practices reveals other factors at work. The case of cattle traders in 
particular shows that taxation policies in Adamaoua today are based on an interplay 
between, on the one hand, modes of state control and levels of administrative ef-
ficiency, and on the other, longstanding repertoires of business practice and idioms 
of documentation.
Résumé: À travers une analyse de la fiscalisation des activités commerciales dans 
la région de l’ Adamaoua au Cameroun, cet article vise à fournir un contexte eth-
nographique aux débats actuels sur “l’effort fiscal” en Afrique subsaharienne. Bien 
que la mission actuelle des autorités d’identifier et de suivre les mouvements et 
activités de contribuables potentiels soit souvent présentée comme un engagement 
à la transparence dans un contexte de réforme nationale, une analyse détaillée des 
pratiques administratives révèle que d’autres facteurs sont en jeu. Si l’on regarde 
le cas particulier des marchands de bétail, il semble que la politique de mobilisa-
tion fiscale en Adamaoua se base d’un côté sur les méthodes gouvernementales de 
contrôle et les niveaux efficacité administrative, et de l’autre sur les procédés com-
merciaux en vigueur et les pratiques documentaires de longue date.
In November 2004, one of the top officials in the provincial tax services in 
Adamaoua Province, Cameroon (whom I will call Monsieur Nana) agreed 
to give me an interview.1 Our conversation lasted almost an hour and a half, 
and he did most of the talking. With few exceptions, he maintained the 
stern tone and meticulous manners of a conscientious civil servant. Early 
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on, he offered a moderately complacent summary of the tax authorities’ 
recent achievements: 
As far as the visible [businesses] are concerned, we make a big effort to 
help people understand what their obligations are. We actually do it for 
their own good, since the owners, in case they are sole proprietors, do not 
generally allocate themselves a salary, and they do not make the difference 
between what belongs to them and what belongs to the enterprise. They 
cannot tell apart their own expenses and those of the enterprise. It is all 
mixed up. We push them to keep some kind of accounts, basic as they may 
be. In the last two years, we have made some progress. At the very least, we 
have succeeded in increasing the number of enterprises in our records. It 
works relatively well as regards the really visible sectors, people who have 
bricks-and-mortar (pignon sur rue) businesses. . . .
During my fieldwork in Adamaoua Province, I came to think of such re-
marks as representative of governmental discourses on how local ways of 
conducting business complicate the state mission to regulate, control, and 
more specifically, tax economic activity. This article argues that such dis-
courses are worth taking seriously and explores one of their main premises: 
namely, that governmental action entails the production of visibility. 
 Nana’s reference to the “big effort” tax authorities were making is con-
gruent with the emphasis of the literature that attempts to assess state ef-
fectiveness in mobilizing revenue (Stotsky & WoldeMariam 1997; Chambas 
2005; Gupta & Tareq 2008). What economists call the “tax effort” is gener-
ally measured by the ratio of tax revenue to GDP. One of the problems in-
volved in interpreting these figures is that they result not only from tax poli-
cies and administrative capacity, which tend to be the privileged objects of 
study, but also from taxpayers’ compliance. This article gives ethnographic 
substance to abstract notions such as the “tax effort” and describes the insti-
tutions and practices that underlie those figures.2 
 In light of recent reforms, the scholarly literature on taxation in sub-
Saharan Africa has noted how “the use of more sophisticated non-coercive 
tax technologies requires detailed knowledge and information about citi-
zens, and this is very difficult in such economies” (Therkildsen 2001:119). 
What it has not provided so far is an account of how such difficulties are 
managed on the ground. This article attempts to begin filling this gap by 
approaching direct taxation as an ethnographic object. It examines the ef-
fects of policies that in sub-Saharan Africa, as elsewhere, have sought to 
reform tax systems and documents the specific institutions and econom-
ic relationships that these policies generate. This is important because it 
sheds light on broader questions concerning the political implications of 
taxation, such as its role in state-building and the kind of governance that 
stems from a historical trajectory in which taxation does not operate as a 
“nexus of representation and accountability” (Guyer 1992:44). An ethno-
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historical approach to the “tax effort” in Adamaoua Province demonstrates, 
to borrow Béatrice Hibou’s apposite words, “the importance of diversity in 
modes of government and the incomplete, unachieved nature of these ar-
rangements” (2004:xiii).
  According to this perspective, current formulas for direct taxation, be-
cause of their reliance on taxpayers’ active participation in the assessment 
of their burden, provide a particularly apt object of study. As is evident in 
Nana’s words, direct taxation presupposes a capacity to turn persons and 
companies into taxpayers and to obtain information about their location, 
movements, activities, and income. This, in turn, entails a wide-ranging 
process of detection and observation in which both state officials and eco-
nomic operators take part. The generic operation that establishes such a 
“visibility” over individuals, as Michel Foucault (1977:184) famously put it, 
turns subjects, either individuals or enterprises, into “fields of documenta-
tion.” In a different vein James Scott (1998) has analyzed state attempts to 
regulate and control the economy through accounting and record keep-
ing as part of a broader “high modernist” project. He has shown how state 
attempts to make society “legible” reduce its ever-changing characteristics 
to a shadow of their experiential reality. Scott has also demonstrated how 
the state cannot operate in the absence of the socially embedded practical 
knowledge that policymakers often disparage. 
 As is evident in Foucault and Scott’s contributions, state attempts to 
make economic activities “visible” and “legible” rely on practices of docu-
mentation, a subject addressed in Jane Guyer’s (2004) work on monetary 
transactions in Atlantic Africa. Guyer has suggested that resistance to the 
fixity and reductionism of the written statement is an enduring feature of 
transactions in this region, and her seminal work on repertoires of econom-
ic action furnishes one of this article’s main sources of inspiration. Another 
important contribution is Janet Roitman’s (2005a) study of “the changing 
foundations of wealth” in the Lake Chad Basin, a vast (and vague) geo-
graphical referent that includes Adamaoua Province. In particular, Roit-
man, inspired by Foucault’s (2007) remarks on “the population–wealth 
couple,” has compellingly rescued from the colonial archives the notion 
of population flottante (floating population) to call our attention to the gov-
ernmental challenge of keeping track of a mobile population. The floating 
population, Roitman argues, looms large in ambiguous areas such as “the 
bush” and “the frontier,” where unregulated practices of wealth creation 
are prevalent.3 
 There are two important dimensions of what I call business visibility that 
lie largely beyond the scope of this article. On the one hand, business own-
ers in Adamaoua need to make their profits seem warranted and justified, 
and this is true not only vis-à-vis state authorities. Harmonious interactions 
in a variety of social groups may depend on the ability to dispel suspicions 
(which may be particularly intense during years of economic crisis) that 
criminal activities and fraud are the source of newly acquired wealth. In ad-
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dition, in Adamaoua, as in many other African contexts, the accumulation 
of capital is open to accusations of sorcery (Geschiere 1997).4 Accordingly, 
strategies and tactics that attempt to make wealth less visible may also be 
directed at staving off sorcery accusations or avoiding associations with the 
world of criminality. 
 On the other hand, a number of factors may push business owners in 
the opposite direction and lead them to engage in an ostentatious display 
of wealth. Conspicuous success can serve, for example, as a showcase of ap-
titude for cooptation into the regime. The advent of multiparty politics in 
the early 1990s made the allegiance of prominent business figures a coveted 
asset for political parties, particularly for the ruling CPDM (Cameroonian 
People’s Democratic Movement), whose position was seriously threatened 
for most of the decade. As a result, some business operators in Adamaoua 
became involved in party politics in search of advantages such as access to 
state contracts and administrative privileges. To rise to prominence in the 
local branches of the CPDM or its rival parties, however, they needed to 
have reached what Ngayap (1983:244) referred to as “the economic thresh-
old of political credibility.” Although the importance of what Victor Fo-
tso, Cameroon’s iconic self-made millionaire, once referred to as “political 
unction” in ensuring business expansion has been highlighted repeatedly 
by scholars, there has been little ethnographic research to date into the 
processes of cooptation of business personalities in Cameroon (See Bayart 
1985, 1986; Geschiere & Konings 1993; Owona Nguini 1998). 
 The following pages are structured in three sections. First, through 
the words of Nana, I introduce the reader to the nature of tax reforms 
in Cameroon and their translation in Adamaoua Province and contrast 
Nana’s account with the strategies and tactics of business owners. Second, 
I examine the case of cattle trade to offer a more comprehensive view of 
how locally prevalent ways of conducting business shape taxation. Third, I 
propose a rethinking of existing discourses on the dialectics between busi-
ness visibility and taxation in light of Adamaoua’s political and economic 
context.
An Inspector Talks
My conversation with Nana inevitably focused on the challenges of working 
within an institutional context in which “reforms are constant.” Like most 
sub-Saharan African countries, Cameroon’s newly independent govern-
ment put in place a tax system that combined high levels of foreign trade 
protection with a wide array of special tax regimes and selective tariff ex-
emptions. In practice these provisions produced blatant inequalities among 
firms, market distortions, corruption among administrators, and tax and 
customs fraud. Under this regime firms also had considerable incentives to 
seek special treatment from the authorities or otherwise evade their obliga-
tions. A reliance on import and export duties was matched by the relative 
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unimportance of internal taxes for the fiscal base of the regime, although 
the head tax, a remnant from colonial times, remained an important means 
of control over the population and a key source of revenue for local au-
thorities.5 The neglect of internal taxation was accentuated from the 1970s 
onward, when oil became by far the largest source of state revenue. 
 The postindependence macroeconomic balance was altered in the sec-
ond half of the 1980s, when state revenues fell steeply (Hugon 1996; Aerts 
et al. 2000; World Bank 2001). The political unrest that accompanied the 
transition from a single-party to a multiparty system further aggravated the 
state’s inability to collect taxes. In 1991 the general strikes known as the 
villes mortes (ghost towns) campaign explicitly called for a tax boycott (see 
Takougang & Krieger 1998; Roitman 2005a). By 1994, when the wave of 
popular discontent had receded somewhat, a program of reforms infused 
new life into the country’s troubled tax system.6 Tax reform in Cameroon 
reflected a strong international consensus advocating broad-based value-
added taxes on consumption, a simplified tax design, and improved tax ad-
ministration (see Fjeldstad & Moore 2009). Changes in personal and busi-
ness taxation were substantial and far-reaching. They included, in 1995, the 
suppression of the head tax and the creation of a specific tax for people 
operating outside the regulatory framework (a flat-rate tax called the im-
pôt libératoire), and in 1998 the introduction of a value-added tax. Reforms 
also created specialized units for the taxation of specific sectors (forestry, 
and cattle and fisheries) and groups of taxpayers (big companies). More-
over, reformers (largely unsuccessfully) pushed for enhanced coordination 
and data-sharing among tax, customs, and social security authorities. There 
have been undeniable improvements, including a steady increase of nonoil 
fiscal revenue figures since the mid-1990s and an increase in the number 
of taxpayers.7 Nevertheless, these improvements have been judged insuf-
ficient. The International Monetary Fund (2007) recently reiterated its as-
sessment that “Cameroon should step up its efforts to mobilize nonoil tax 
revenues so that it can finance additional expenditure.” Indeed, reformers 
think that there is still a long way to go. What this “fiscal transition” implies 
in practice, and where it may lead, are two of the broader questions on 
which this article tries to shed light.
 Nana confided during our interview that as far as Adamaoua was con-
cerned, the provincial tax authorities’ top priority was to “make the in-
formal sector shrink.” He explained that he was mainly talking about “vi-
able enterprises that are visible,” although there are also “underground” 
businesses that totally evade control. A third category of economic agents, 
which he referred to as “those who do not have a store,” covers the fuzzy 
realm between the visible and the underground. This includes people who 
have their office “in a suitcase” and “go around to gagner un marché [get a 
contract] here and there.” The cattle sector as a whole also falls within this 
intermediate category, as do other practices generally grouped under the 
label of “diversification.” Nana gave an example of
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someone . . .  [who] sells a bit of this and a bit of that… Let’s say it is a trans-
porter who raises some cattle on the side… Taxing cattle is an uphill task. 
Then, [taxing] transport is almost as difficult, since [transporters] do not 
stay put. In order to cheat, they go to a subdistrict or a small municipality, 
they get a patente [license] there, and that is the end of it. 
 From Nana’s point of view, the provincial tax services work on two main 
fronts. In the first place, they must “débusquer”—or “flush out”—taxpayers 
who try to hide. Success in this domain, he told me, involves a considerable 
amount of “descentes sur le terrain” (inspection visits; literally, “going down 
to the field”). This turn of phrase, widely used in Cameroon’s administra-
tive language, refers to state agents’ incursions in the world outside their of-
fices (markets, stores, and other arenas of economic activity) for purposes 
of control.8 The image of descente aptly expresses how government officials 
nationwide handle both their tasks and themselves. As my interviewee was 
eager to point out, such methods had yielded considerable results in recent 
years. To overcome their inability to find taxpayers when needed, provin-
cial tax authorities had also put new emphasis on an existing provision that 
requires enterprises to furnish a plan de localisation (location map). Identify-
ing new taxpayers and locating their whereabouts, however, is only a first 
step, since business owners whose names are included in the lists of taxpay-
ers are not necessarily willing to disclose the full scope of their activities. 
 The tax authorities’ second concern involves exacting higher payments 
from those taxpayers they have already identified, since, as Nana put it, 
“generally they all hide some thing or other.” This was done, he explained, 
by working from information about business turnover—evidence ranging 
from figures provided by suppliers and clients about their transactions to 
more indirect “external signs of wealth.” On such a basis, people could find 
their tax regime changed and their tax bill increased as part of a patterned 
disciplinary itinerary: 
To take in those taxpayers who have just come out of the informal sector, 
we have what we call the impôt libératoire [flat tax]. The idea is to make 
them get used to coming to us and to keeping accounts, no matter how 
rough. We try to get a sense of the volume of their activities. If these are 
substantial and we realize that their turnover is probably over 15 million 
[CFA francs], we move them to a different tax regime, either the basic or 
the simplified one, depending on the circumstances. Then we are making 
progress in all four existing [tax] regimes. We try to assign enterprises a 
[tax] regime and then see how they apply themselves to it.
 Nana preferred to gloss over the politically difficult context in which 
the flat tax (impôt libératoire) had been introduced in 1995, when the 
government tried to recover the lost ground after the tax boycott of the 
1991 strikes. He suggested that the tax authorities had now outgrown the 
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modest revenue objectives that had inspired the creation of this tax. As he 
put it, “In order to accommodate the difficulties of the toughest years of the 
crisis, the government had resigned itself to situations that were no longer 
acceptable.” He was adamant that for any economic activity that went be-
yond petty trade or market vending, flat tax formulas would be phased out 
in the near future: “[The impôt libératoire] is not a good tax, not at all. It 
was created to attract people who were coming out of the informal sector 
and lacked the habit of filing tax forms. We put them there for monitoring 
purposes, so that we can later move them to a more rigorous [tax] regime.” 
This, he conceded, was what the new “managerial” principles governing 
the collection and inspection services asked for. “We are now compelled to 
deliver in terms of results, somewhat like the private [sector],” he added. At 
the provincial and district levels the system relies now on annual revenue 
targets.9 
 In the remaining part of the interview, Nana pondered the implications 
of “the partnership between tax authorities and citizens” (a favorite phrase 
in his ministry’s recent documents). He discussed the difficulties involved 
in adapting to constant reforms and deplored the “insufficient and always 
trying” relationships among the tax administration, customs authorities, 
and other governmental agencies. I also had a chance to probe for his views 
on specific aspects of the recent reforms. He answered all my questions 
deftly, smoothing over problematic aspects whenever he saw fit. “I believe 
all this will give you a good enough idea of what our job has been in recent 
years,” he said to announce that the interview had come to a close.
 Despite Nana’s optimism, during fieldwork I had many opportunities 
to witness how economic actors resort to practices that allow them to re-
main more or less invisible to the tax authorities. In some instances the 
activities themselves lead easily to reduced visibility. The suitcase trade and 
house-based enterprises, which informants agreed have flourished since 
the late 1980s, provide obvious examples; so does the work of state contrac-
tors, who conduct business from their homes, from a workplace not directly 
related to their entrepreneurial activity, or from the provincial offices of the 
relevant ministries where contracts are offered and awarded and payments 
obtained. 
 Transport and cattle, two sectors singled out by Nana as tough nuts to 
crack, constitute the economic pillars of Adamaoua. Most trucking compa-
nies based in Ngaoundéré, the country’s transport hub linking railway and 
road, do not have an office. Karine Bennafla (2003) has documented the 
role of transporters based in northern Cameroon in both legal and illegal 
cross-border trade. While on the road, truck drivers are exposed to con-
stant demands for money from the police and gendarmes, which make the 
possession of a panoply of “papers,” including tax receipts, both necessary 
and insufficient. Still, transporters are skilled in hiding much of the scope 
of their activities from outside scrutiny. Cattle breeding, for its part, benefits 
from a less stringent tax treatment than other economic activities.10 Breed-
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ers pay taxes and veterinary fees on animal sales in cattle markets, and also 
a tax per head of cattle owned—although generally for holdings well be-
low the actual ones. However, the tax authorities’ control over breeders 
concerning the direct taxation of their income is largely ineffectual. Cattle 
traders, a group to which I devote a later section, also prove distinctively 
elusive for tax purposes.
 It seemed obvious that, as Nana insisted, having an open store or an 
office makes the task of preserving invisibility harder. But as he himself 
was well aware, most businesses that need identifiable locations to oper-
ate on a regular basis tend to present a front that does not fully reveal 
backstage operations. Anyone taking an inventory of many of the general 
trading businesses in Adamaoua’s urban centers would embark on an odd 
itinerary through mostly domestic storage areas. As I saw for myself during 
fieldwork, there is a vast discrepancy between the goods on display in the 
often modest stores and the volume of stocks in different locations. This 
overlap between household and business spheres, which Nana decried in 
our interview, is not necessarily the result of unenlightened management 
practices, as he suggested, but rather a calculated assessment that the wide 
spatial distribution of goods affords, among other advantages, some respite 
from tax pressures.
 Other factors also tend to thwart tax collection. For example, the phe-
nomenon of diversification, a widespread practice in a context in which 
wealth concentration is fraught with risks, complicates the identification of 
certain business operators, not only for the tax authorities, as Nana noted, 
but also for researchers like me. Thus, once I got to know my informants 
more deeply, my initial assumptions about the scope of their activities of-
ten changed. Side investments in cattle, real estate, and transport easily go 
unnoticed, and sometimes these secondary operations are the ones that 
provide a base for more substantial activities. In addition, moves toward 
increased exposure are also easily reversible, and this is a course of action 
that sometimes is followed when circumstances change. One of Adamao-
ua’s building contractors for Exxon-Mobil’s Chad–Cameroon pipeline, for 
example, closed its premises once the construction phase came to an end, 
although this certainly did not prevent them from continuing their work 
for the state and other clients afterward. 
 Of course, the larger the volume of business, the harder it becomes 
to avoid visibility. Some of my informants with expanding businesses were 
fairly explicit about the trade-offs between size and visibility. Below a certain 
size, it is easier to bypass tax and other administrative regulations, at least 
partially. A frequent line of action is the fragmentation of enterprises into 
several units or segments. Even fairly large businesses by local standards 
have premises that are not noticeable from the street and bear no exter-
nal signs of identification. According to one of my informants, a founder 
and administrator of an NGO whose office is located inside his family com-
pound, “Somebody just passing by could not know that this is where we 
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are. Our clients are very selective, it is mostly people who know us well” 
(personal interview, 2004). 
 In relation to taxation, NGOs occupied a particularly interesting posi-
tion at the time of my fieldwork. Because they were conceived of as out-
side the business domain, they benefited from a general tax exemption. 
However, the legal status of NGOs in Cameroon remained typically vague. 
The approval of specific legislation had dragged on for years, such that the 
number of organizations that had official recognition in the country was 
ludicrously low.11 As of 2004 the authorities recognized no organization 
in Adamaoua as an NGO. These legal ambiguities are particularly sensitive 
for NGOs whose activities differ little from, for example, those of a state 
contractor. For them, more visibility might mean unduly alerting tax audi-
tors about the nature of their activities.12 Yet my informant did not rule out 
moving to a more noticeable location if circumstances made it advisable. 
Such decisions are not uncommon for NGOs, whose clients do not neces-
sarily appreciate extreme avoidance of public exposure and whose standing 
with national and international donors may depend, among other things, 
on visibility and maintaining presentable offices. In Ngaoundéré, for ex-
ample, I witnessed how an NGO, facing an external audit after working as 
a local partner for the national AIDS committee, rented office space in the 
city center to prepare for the auditors’ visit. 
 At any rate, concealment, in short, is part of the repertoire of Adama-
oua’s business operators, and it offers a variety of options for dealing with 
state controls, and more specifically with the scrutiny of tax authorities. 
If we borrow Michel de Certeau’s (1988) terminology, such practices, de-
pending on the context, may have both tactical and strategic dimensions, to 
the point that there is no neat dichotomy. Take the case of state contractors 
who “have their office in a briefcase” and disappear when circumstances 
make it advisable; or young traffickers who bring smuggled motorcycles 
from Nigeria, keeping them inside their family compound until they can 
sell them in Adamaoua or take them to the Central African Republic; or 
even the small-time cattle traders who anonymously ship animals to Yaoun-
dé by train. The labor invested in passing unnoticed in such cases stems 
from tactical improvisations and ad hoc calculations. Consider, by contrast, 
important cattle breeders who report to the tax authorities and the Min-
istry of Livestock (MINEPIA) provincial services only a token number of 
the head of cattle they own scattered in several herds throughout the prov-
ince; or large trading groups in Adamaoua who sell tax-exempt goods in 
the Cameroonian market on transit to other Central African countries; or 
transport and construction firms that hire a certified public accountant to 
“cook” the books. Such calculations reflect both tactical considerations and 
larger strategic motives, depending on the actors’ legal standing, status, 
and resources. 
 According to what I observed, almost everyone who owns a business in 
Adamaoua is engaged in some concealing operation or other within the 
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range of possibilities that the nature and the size of their activities afford 
them. Practices aimed at attenuating visibility weigh heavily on widespread 
perceptions of business owners among state officials and large segments of 
the population, and Nana’s remarks in this regard were certainly not un-
founded. And yet many such business practices cannot be explained away 
solely as responses to control from tax and other governmental authorities. 
Invisibility in some instances is more a side effect than something deliber-
ately sought after. I argue that such a portrayal of business owners ignores 
the larger context in which the tax relationship takes place.
Taxing the Cattle Trade 
Nana specifically mentioned cattle as one of the sectors in the provincial 
economy in which taxation poses significant problems. He also made ex-
plicit that the tax officials’ latest efforts had targeted cattle traders, esp-
cially those who use the railway to ship cattle to the south. In this section, 
I examine the contours of the relationship between cattle traders and tax 
authorities in recent years. 
 During the 1991 villes mortes campaigns, Adamaoua was one of the 
national hotspots. A significant number of the cattle traders I interviewed, 
including some who were in their early twenties at the time of the strikes, 
retrospectively saw the villes mortes as the work of unemployed youth led 
astray by political opponents of the regime. All the same, their detachment 
from those who had taken to the streets in 1991 did not prevent many of 
them from taking advantage of the tax administration’s weak position in 
the aftermath of the strikes.13 
 In 1995, with the creation of the impôt libératoire, tax authorities tried 
to reclaim their grip on businesses that were not being taxed formally. Many 
cattle traders in Adamaoua saw this tax as an attractive option, since it pro-
vided them with a legal document they could present in their trips to cattle 
markets. This was far from immaterial to people subject to constant road 
checks by gendarmes and police, who in their daily search for a few extra 
thousand franc do not see verifications of tax payments as lying outside 
their mission. Traders could obtain such a legal cover cheaply.14 
 In 1999, a particularly bad year for the provincial treasury, tax authori-
ties decided the time had come to take a tougher stance on the cattle sec-
tor. At that point cattle traders were either paying the impôt libératoire, 
which was supposed to free them from any further tax liabilities (licenses 
included), or limiting themselves to acquiring a license without bothering 
to pay their commercial income tax at the end of the year. To put an end 
to this state of affairs, the head of the provincial tax services had the gover-
nor issue an ordinance that established the obligation to pay advances on 
commercial income tax when shipping cattle by train. The amount of these 
advances was set at 1 percent of the value of the cattle being shipped. 
 A full discussion of the many controversial aspects of this ordinance 
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(Arrêté Provincial no. 45, Sept. 17, 1999), which met the open resistance of 
both breeders and traders from the start, exceeds the scope of this article.15 
The crucial point is that from 1999 onward, railway transport for cattle was 
made contingent upon the payment of these tax advances; therefore, those 
traders who wanted to keep using the railway had little choice but to pay. 
The arrangements put in place to collect these advances, however, were not 
able to generate a clear picture of who was trading what. Camrail, the rail-
way company that had been privatized earlier in 1999, was commissioned to 
collect these funds on the tax authorities’ behalf.16 Camrail registered the 
payments made for a whole freight car under the name of a trader, but a 
single trader normally transported only a portion of those cattle. With these 
data, tax authorities could not assess individual traders’ turnover. 
 In addition, despite these measures, revenue from tax advances paid by 
cattle traders has waned in recent times, largely because cattle shipments 
to Yaoundé by train have declined significantly since 2001. In the face of 
the ensuing decrease in the collection of tax advances, and within the new 
framework of annual revenue targets, tax authorities could not stand on 
the sidelines. A meeting that I attended in February 2004, one of the regu-
lar gatherings organized by the Association Nationale des Commerçants à 
Bétail de Cameroun (ANCBC, National Association of Cattle Traders) for 
its members in Ngaoundéré, provided an indication of things to come. The 
ANCBC had invited a senior tax official as one of several guest speakers at a 
seminar on “the modernization of the cattle trading profession.” After a re-
view of the different tax rules and regulations to which traders were subject, 
the official warned that they had better start paying taxes “before things get 
serious.” Those words, which at the time seemed inconsequential, resonat-
ed differently in late August 2004 when a letter from the Directeur Général 
des Impôts (DGI, general manager of taxes) became public knowledge. 
Although nominally addressed to the railway company, the letter was re-
ally addressed to the cattle traders by proxy. Its opening paragraph read as 
follows: “The transport of cattle from the north to the south of Cameroon 
by Camrail’s cargo trains has always had a positive impact in our country’s 
economy. In spite of this, cattle traders, the main actors involved in this 
activity, have increasingly resorted to bypassing tax authorities, disowning 
their duty to contribute to the funding of public spending.” Accordingly, 
the DGI was announcing a series of new measures intended to enhance 
sécurisation des recettes (revenue reliability), including verification of compli-
ance with tax obligations before any trader was allowed to load cattle in 
Camrail’s freight cars. 
 Ensuing rumors generated anxiety among some traders. The following 
week a couple of traders decided at the last minute not to ship cattle to 
Yaoundé on account of the potential risks. Others overcame their misgiv-
ings and carried on with their weekly transactions—always making sure that 
their names did not figure in Camrail’s records. Soon after, one of Ngaoun-
déré’s two main groups of traders held a well-attended crisis meeting to dis-
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cuss proposed courses of action, and specifically what their collective posi-
tion would be in foreseeable meetings with state representatives.17 A variety 
of opinions was expressed. Some regretted having neglected the bureau-
cratic aspects of their trade for a long time. Others asked for a negotiation 
of an amnesty of past dues with the tax authorities. Most emphasized par-
ticular problems in the tax system. After a thorough discussion, the ANCBC 
president made some concluding remarks. Cattle traders, he pointed out, 
work in an economic environment in which “70 percent of cattle transac-
tions are carried out by unauthorized traders.” This means that traders like 
themselves, whose operations had expanded outside Adamaoua, needed 
to detach themselves from petty traders who lacked the means to become 
“true professionals.” He assured them that bringing to the table the issue 
of an amnesty concerning past dues would be a tactical mistake, and sug-
gested instead that they should champion a process of “regularization” of 
business licenses. “Can we all pay and get our papers straight? Can we show 
the authorities a document [saying] ‘such and such [traders] are active, 
such and such have given up?’” he asked everyone present. Doing so would 
turn things around and allow them to make demands rather than endure 
pressures from the authorities. If they were all operating in accordance with 
the rules, Adamaoua-based traders would be able to argue for a change in 
the discriminatory system of tax advances. Regularization would also allow 
them to press authorities to live up to their responsibilities to fight corrup-
tion, market insecurity, and imports of foreign beef. But first he needed 
everyone to realize that “you cannot work without papers.” The meeting 
was adjourned with the unanimous decision that the president would act as 
their spokesman.
 This preparatory gathering, and a myriad of informal daily exchanges, 
led to a September 10, 2004, meeting in which, under the auspices of the 
prefect of Vina (a district in Adamaoua Province), traders sat at the same 
table with both the Chef de Centre des Impôts (CCI, chief of the district tax 
center) and the MINEPIA (livestock ministry) provincial delegate.18 At the 
meeting, the ANCBC president maintained that the traders were commit-
ted to paying their taxes; state revenue from the cattle trade had declined 
in the past few years only because cattle flows from Adamaoua Province 
to the country’s main urban centers had sharply declined: “There is no 
esprit de contournement [ethos of tax avoidance],” he argued. “It is rather that 
many traders have incurred losses and as a result have scaled down their op-
erations in Yaoundé and Douala.” The CCI refused to accept this explana-
tion, however. In his view, no matter how changed market conditions may 
have become, the cattle traders blatantly defaulted on the bulk of their tax 
payments. He was a neutral official who simply aspired to enforce existing 
norms. As such, he had to remind cattle traders of the specific obligations 
imposed by tax law. 
 The CCI’s entreaties to take these norms at face value fell flat. Cattle 
traders refused to limit the meeting to the question of whether they ad-
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hered to regulations; they were intent on discussing the status and rationale 
of some of these regulations. After a two-hour-long give and take, in which 
the prefect and the MINEPIA delegate also had leading roles, the meeting 
resolved little, although it laid the foundations for an extralegal appropria-
tion on the Vina District cattle traders’ tax bill.19 Soon after the meeting 
the leaders of the district traders’ two main groups and the CCI reached an 
agreement. The CCI forwent that year’s outstanding commercial income 
tax payments, and in exchange the traders’ representatives agreed to urge 
the members of their groups to pay a business license and to ban anyone 
from shipping cattle by train without a license. Yet it still took a couple of 
weeks for those resolutions to materialize.
 In mid-November 2004 the prefect published the list of authorized 
cattle traders. It included thirty-four names—eight fewer than the forty-two 
on the previous year’s list. Some of the least powerful traders had paired 
up in order to get a license. A few even decided to remain under the impôt 
libératoire in open defiance of the authorities and their own peers. Yet very 
few of the traders on the list had obtained their license before the Septem-
ber 10 meeting, and the move many had made from the impôt libératoire 
to paying for a license was a significant change. It was increasingly clear that 
for those who used the railway to ship cattle to the south, life could become 
difficult without a business license—at least until pressures on Camrail to 
intensify controls were relaxed. Accordingly, most of these traders paid for 
their license.
 In truth, the sum at stake in switching from one category of taxpayer 
to the other was relatively small both for individual traders and the tax au-
thorities.20 To the tax authorities, similarly, the payment of a few additional 
licenses made little difference within the larger picture of the provincial 
treasury. Even when compared with the funds from tax advances that they 
collected through Camrail, the sum raised from those extra licenses was 
negligible. All the same, Nana and his colleagues could present this to their 
superiors in the capital as a symbolic step in the right direction. It allowed 
the tax authorities to have a slightly larger group of cattle traders in their 
orbit. 
 However, the maximalist horizon hinted at in the DGI’s letter—namely 
that individual traders disclose the full extent of their activities by filing 
their quarterly income tax forms—was never realized, and there was no re-
alistic prospect of enforcing controls to bar unauthorized traders from cat-
tle markets. There was also little chance that tax authorities could enforce 
regular submission of their quarterly income tax forms. When I visited Ad-
amaoua in August 2005, I learned that most traders were not submitting 
these forms. They believed that they were already taxed well above accept-
able levels when they paid their weekly tax advances at the railway station. 
Bearing in mind existing standards of the state’s bureaucratic capacity and 
patterns of cattle trade organization in Adamaoua’s present circumstances, 
most of the tax measures announced in August 2004 had little chance of 
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implementation. Large segments of the cattle trade remained formally un-
taxed: the only traders who paid their business license were those who used 
the railway to transport cattle. Cattle transactions were subject to different 
kinds of indirect taxes, such as veterinary inspection fees and market dues, 
but commercial income from cattle trade that used means of transport oth-
er than the railway escaped formal taxation. Traders who avoided paying 
commercial income tax, however, were not spared the brunt of a whole 
series of extralegal payments exacted by different law enforcement officials, 
who, as the ANCBC president put it, fully exploited “the potentiel d’arnaque 
[swindling potential]” of tax regulations.
Rethinking Business Visibility
It is worth looking closely at how Nana’s discourse, which conceives of the 
tax authorities’ job in Adamaoua largely as an undoing of concealment 
practices, constructs the targets of state action. In line with most govern-
ment-authorized discourse, Nana still refers to the domain in which such 
practices prevail as “the informal sector.” Other state officials I knew col-
loquially called this domain le maquis (brushwood, or an inaccessible area 
used as refuge, and, metonymically, a resistance movement). This term es-
tablishes a parallel between unregulated business practices and the guerrilla 
war fought by the UPC against French colonial rule and its Cameroonian 
heirs (1957–71). During the September 10, 2004, meeting between cattle 
traders and tax officials, the MINEPIA delegate furnished a fairly typical 
example of such a usage. Deploring the traders’ reluctance to apply for 
agréments (administrative permits), he observed, to everyone’s amusement, 
that “[cattle] traders shy away from light, they love darkness” and that “to 
trade cattle without a permit, that is le maquis.” 
 Janet Roitman (2005a:37–47) has aptly analyzed references to “le 
maquis” in encounters between state officials and business operators in her 
account of an April 1993 meeting between senior officials and merchants in 
the city of Maroua, Far-North Province. One of the officials she quotes re-
ferred to it as the political and economic space in which those who refuse to 
pay taxes place themselves. In Roitman’s interpretation, by means of such 
labeling officials identify spheres of economic informality with spheres of 
political opposition, if not with subversion and criminality (see also Roit-
man 2007:195). In Adamaoua’s business context in 2004, with the villes 
mortes protests considerably more distant in time, references to “le maquis” 
were more ambiguous. While they certainly drew from the governmental 
imaginary of incivisme fiscal (fiscal disobedience, in Roitman’s translation), 
which stigmatizes those situated there as bad citizens, they were also light-
hearted enough to provoke laughter. As much as business operators did in 
Roitman’s account, those I encountered often vindicated “le maquis” as a 
legitimate space providing a convenient refuge from the excesses of venal 
Business Visibility and Taxation in Northern Cameroon 163
officials, which they can enter and leave as a matter of course in the pursuit 
of commercial gains. Perhaps the main difference is that as a result of a 
decade of reforms, my informants who thought of themselves as inhabiting 
“le maquis” were involved in official tax payments to a higher degree than 
those merchants in Maroua conceivably were. 
 Both the informal sector and “le maquis” appear to escape the gaze of 
the state. In Nana’s formulation, the informal sector is a sphere of invisibil-
ity, a difficult place for tax authorities to venture. “Le maquis,” as the MINE-
PIA delegate put it, constitutes a realm of darkness, where cattle traders 
are in their element. It is the mission of MINEPIA and other governmental 
agencies to shed light on it. Both the informal sector and “le maquis” are 
also spaces from which economic actors emerge (sortir de l’informel, sortir du 
maquis) unwillingly. In this view, state officials, working against the grain of 
business operators’ strategies and tactics, render visible the invisible, shed 
light upon what is dark. Indeed, visual references figured prominently in 
Nana’s remarks, in which he categorized business ventures in the province 
according to degrees of visibility (the visible, the not-so-visible, and the un-
derground) and portrayed business operators as incessantly hiding some-
thing: first and foremost themselves, and then, once “flushed out” by the 
tax authorities, “something or other.” 
 Nevertheless, some groups whose presence looms large in the realms of 
invisibility pursue their activities in broad daylight. Consider the cattle trade, 
the main focus of this article. Cattle traders operate in highly public spaces, 
where their transactions are recorded. Although cattle transactions outside 
markets have been a significant historical factor in Adamaoua (see Lacrouts 
& Sarniguet 1965:161; Douffissa 1993:208), traders make a large portion of 
their purchases and sales in official markets, where their trade is regulated 
and monitored. No matter how small or inaccessible, these weekly markets 
feature the presence of, at the very least, a veterinary agent from MINEPIA 
and a municipal official, who collect veterinary certification fees and market 
dues and register every transaction in writing. Therefore, attempts at conceal-
ment are only part of the story. Rather, the main difficulty for tax authorities 
is that the crowds of traders and herds that make up a market are not ame-
nable to a systematic follow-up of individual traders. In addition, the available 
handwritten information on each and every transaction in the province’s cat-
tle markets is not of much use for control purposes. 
 Cattle shipments by train, for which a tax advance is required, might of-
fer a more convenient point of control. However, at the time of my research 
the most important traders in Ngaoundéré dispatched southward less than 
twenty head of cattle a week at peak periods of the year. This fragmentation 
of cattle trade meant that most trading ventures were excluded from what 
Nana called “viable enterprises that are visible.” No matter how conspicu-
ous their activities may be, they were not visible enough to make it worth-
while for the authorities to follow up closely.
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 Therefore, the cattle traders’ purported aversion to light and visibility, 
or a proclivity to hide themselves and the cattle they trade, does not lie at 
the heart of the tax authorities’ inability to enforce regulations and tax 
their commercial income. Rather, what makes them extremely elusive is 
their mobility, the relatively small scope of their trade, and lack of business 
premises—three attributes deriving from this economic sector’s present 
patterns of organization. Indeed, as Nana’s remarks made abundantly clear, 
it is mostly bricks-and-mortar businesses that provide the sort of visibility tax 
authorities can put to use. 
 In addition, structural and administrative problems with the tax col-
lection system—what Nana had called “the weaknesses of the system”—are 
many and persistent. The lack of an updated census since 1987 bears wit-
ness to the extent to which the Cameroonian state is simply not up to the 
task.21 The collapse of statistical services and the absence of a systematic 
update of taxpayer records, together with broader institutional factors such 
as generalized corruption of disaffected officials with extremely scarce re-
sources at their disposal, have eroded the state’s ability to do what the re-
forms demand. Nana himself said that it was only in 2002 that the provin-
cial tax services had made an attempt to update taxpayers’ records. Before 
that—and, according to most of my informants, as far back as the early 
stages of the crisis—they had been handling a practically useless directory 
of enterprises. Not only did it list scores of defunct businesses, but it also 
failed to include very prosperous (and visible) ones. A situation in which 
an enterprise obtained a license and subsequently failed to pay its income 
tax was by no means exceptional. Consider, for instance, Nana’s example 
of transporters who went to a subdistrict or a small municipality to obtain 
their license. In such places where tax authorities do not have a presence, 
a subprefect or a mayor acted in their name. Tax authorities subsequently 
failed to make these transporters pay income tax both because they could 
not get hold of them and because information did not circulate efficiently 
between tax authorities and such local level representatives of the state. 
Neither, for that matter, did tax authorities share files or compare data with 
either customs or the social security system.22 
 At present, it does not help that access to new legislative texts are not a 
given even for tax officials.23 In the September 10, 2004, meeting on the taxa-
tion of cattle trade, the ANCBC president pointed this out with sharp irony. 
After a particularly blatant instance of the CCI’s referring to legislation no 
longer in force, he admitted that he was “in need of enlightenment [about 
tax regulations], because, you know, we have copies of the Tax Code too. 
We try to make use of them. That is why we are surprised to find we are out 
of sync with you.” Nevertheless, the main obstacles concerned not so much 
the diffusion and popularization of new tax formulas and categories as the 
absence of an efficient state apparatus committed to enforcing them. 
 And what is perhaps the most significant barrier is the taxpayers’ failure 
to internalize such norms. Cameroon’s taxation system as a whole is a système 
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déclaratif, that is, a system that relies heavily on taxpayers’ self-assessment. 
Not only is the bulk of direct taxation now income-based (in sharp contrast 
with the not-distant times of the head tax), but the system also (at least in 
principle) takes taxpayers’ reports as the point of departure to determine 
their tax bill. Even when applying for an official business license, whose cost 
depends on the previous year’s turnover, taxpayers generally give figures 
that bear no relation to the extent of their activities. They systematically 
fail to file tax forms when required. In the few instances when they do in 
fact file them, or when the authorities assign them an income ex officio for 
having failed to do so, they more often than not lack the documentation to 
back up the figures under discussion. In short, they actively resist the docu-
mentary practices that self-reporting entails and presupposes. I suggest that 
interpreting this resistance exclusively in terms of tax evasion, as observers 
like Nana tend to do, is a mistake, since it disregards what ethnographic ob-
servation reveals: that such resistance is an embedded feature of the regular 
operation of large segments of the provincial economy. 
 As Jane Guyer (2004:155–56) has suggested, recalcitrance to “docu-
ment mandated equations” is an enduring feature of monetary transac-
tions in Atlantic Africa. This recalcitrance is certainly an active ingredient 
in some of the sectors of activity in which I worked. The example of the 
cattle trade is perhaps an extreme illustration of this. Doing without the 
formalities that allow tax authorities to carry out their task is a substantial 
part of their business. The actual transport of cattle is only one part of the 
business enterprise. Traders are constantly moving back and forth between 
the rural areas where cattle are raised and the urban centers where they are 
slaughtered. Their integration and constant presence in both poles of the 
cattle economy are the basis for enacting “charismatic resolutions” (Guyer 
2004:98) that, avoiding formalization, result in monetary gains. Neither the 
credit facilities they may get from suppliers nor their sales to butchers—
who invariably buy on credit (or as traders would say, bee hunduko [with the 
mouth])—are put in writing. Within such extreme forms of what econo-
mists call “incomplete contracts” there is always room for flexibility and 
revision of terms. A trader may persuade the cattle breeder who entrusted 
him with cattle to accept a lower price than the one initially agreed upon on 
the basis, for example, of difficult market conditions due to excess supply 
in Yaoundé. The breeder may also be forced to accept a late payment if the 
trader has been let down by an insolvent butcher. Similarly, on the selling 
end, butchers who get less meat from an animal than they had anticipated 
may force traders to revise the initial price downward. These chains of trust 
and debt, which operate largely outside formal financial circuits, do not 
rely on documents or on the law enforcement institutions where such docu-
ments are actionable. Verbal agreements are honored, if only flexibly and 
within a loose time frame, based on the value of reputation, the pressure of 
professional groups, and the assets owned by butchers and traders—such as 
real estate, vehicles, and most important, their own often sizeable herds—
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which can be seized if things take a bad turn.
 Documents are not entirely absent in cattle transactions. Sometimes 
these transactions are accompanied by a signed voucher recording the head 
of cattle received and the agreed price but generally omitting repayment 
schedules. This tends to be the case when transactions concern a substantial 
number of cattle and borrowers are strangers. Even in such circumstances, 
agreements may be purely verbal. An experienced cattle trader who oper-
ated between Adamaoua’s Mbéré District and Yaoundé once gave me the 
following explanation as to why cattle traders do not document their trans-
actions: 
If someone comes and the first thing they say is “I put this in writing for 
you” (je te fais des papiers), you instantly know something is wrong. You do 
not deal with those kinds of people. They are already thinking about not 
paying back. And, whether you are a breeder or a trader, you know that 
a voucher is a dead letter. Going to court is out of the question. Those 
who take these things to the police know that they too get their cut, so in 
recovering a million [CFA francs] you lose a third along the way. A new-
comer, instead of offering to write anything down, should rather bring 
along someone you know that can vouch for him. That way, if there is any 
problem, that third party is going to intervene and you will recover your 
money. (Personal interview, 2004)
In fact, it is often when the first problems in fulfilling an agreement come 
to the surface that a document may be drawn up as a renewal of the debt-
or’s commitment to eventually honor it. 
 Cattle traders, much like most other operators in Adamaoua Province, 
produce a myriad of documents in their daily routine despite their lim-
ited use of documents to record transactions. Rather than giving an accu-
rate image of their activities, these documents provide the means to cross 
thresholds. Many such “papers” do not establish any truth about economic 
activity, but instead are widely acknowledged as simulacra. The payment 
receipt from the flat-rate impôt libératoire, for instance, is mostly a piece of 
paper that helps cattle traders pass checkpoints on their way to cattle mar-
kets. Similarly, the payment of tax advances is perceived as a requirement 
for shipping cattle by train rather than an intermediate step in establish-
ing the extent of individual traders’ activities and setting them on track to 
fulfill all reporting and tax payment obligations. These payments (and the 
receipts they generate) make circulation of goods and people possible, but 
little more.24 
 Other lines of activity do not escape formalities to the degree that cattle 
trade does. Other sectors may lend themselves more easily to the disciplin-
ary technologies of taxation. Yet according to my data on the provincial 
economy, even a sector as closely linked to the state apparatus as state 
contracting (marchés publics) also demonstrates a haphazard adherence to 
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formalities. In short, business owners in Adamaoua Province tend not to 
behave like compliant taxpayers, fulfilling their role (even minimally) in 
furnishing tax authorities with an accurate image of their assets and activi-
ties. Operating informally, whether in regard to tax-related matters or in 
terms of their everyday activities, is to a large extent the substance of what 
these business owners do. And state agents lack the resources (and often 
the commitment) to turn business owners into so-called fields of documen-
tation. 
Conclusion: Meeting the Eye of the State
This article has examined interactions between tax officials and business 
owners in Cameroon’s Adamaoua Province (particularly cattle traders in 
the Vina District) as an instance of widespread notions about the difficulties 
experienced by states in sub-Saharan Africa in their efforts to raise revenue 
from their citizens during a period ostensibly marked by the reform of ad-
ministration and policy. Nana, like many other officials and nonofficials, 
constructs taxation as a battleground between taxpayers’ determination to 
make themselves and their activities invisible, on the one hand, and tax 
authorities’ counterwork to make them visible, on the other. Placing the 
ethnographic lens at the interface between business activities and state con-
trols, I have drawn a more complex picture in which business practices are 
not exclusively driven by tax evasion or avoidance, and the role of officials 
as scrupulous regulation enforcers cannot be taken for granted. 
 Despite Nana’s statements stressing how authorities are both “pushing” 
business owners to account for themselves and their activities, and control-
ling “how they apply themselves to it,” it would seem that the Cameroonian 
state is not particularly committed to obtaining or dispensing much knowl-
edge about its subjects. As Frederick Cooper (1994:153) has noted, power 
in many colonial and postcolonial societies “can be more arterial than cap-
illary.” In postindependence Cameroon, the continuity of arterial power 
dynamics can be gleaned from the enduring importance of the head tax, 
the insistence on the carrying of national identity and one-party cards, and 
the carry-over of policies such as that of village regroupement. 25 
 In the 1990s, in a context of severe crisis, high points of the challenge 
to the country’s fiscal arrangements were the villes mortes campaign and 
the radical program of tax reforms. The villes mortes figure prominently in 
Janet Roitman’s analyses (Roitman 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2007, 2008). 
The tax reforms, on the contrary, took place largely after Roitman had con-
cluded much of her fieldwork. In this sense, the preceding pages provide a 
supplement to her research. Indeed, the Vina District cattle traders could 
well be considered as falling within the category of the “population flot-
tante” which, as Roitman uses the term, comprises a hodgepodge including 
“market boys” in Garoua in the 1950s, brigands on the riverbanks of the 
Logone-Chari at around the same period, petrol smugglers in Maroua in 
the 1990s, and moto-taxi drivers and highway robbers in Adamaoua in the 
present decade. After all, the cattle traders’ mobility and their frequent 
transgression of national borders—for example, trading cattle in Nigeria, 
a formally outlawed activity that continues unabated—pose obvious prob-
lems for governmental controls. 
 What do these groups share in common? They confront the state with 
the problem of controlling flows of money, goods and, crucially, people. 
However, governmental responses to this problem have not been undiffer-
entiated (different groups elicit different responses), and neither have they 
remained unchanged over time. These cattle traders’ codes of behavior, 
forms of subjectivation, and practices of the self do not necessarily coin-
cide with those of their contemporary moto-taxi drivers and highway rob-
bers. Furthermore, since 1995, “manners of extraction based on traditional 
methods (such as taxation based on a census)” (Roitman 2004:247) have 
ceased to be government policy; the head tax no longer “summarizes the 
impôt” (Roitman 2005a:49). Unlike moto-taxi drivers and highway robbers, 
cattle traders are now being subject to an income tax. Unlike the head tax, 
this mode of taxation involves not only obligations to pay, which the trad-
ers are partly fulfilling through the payment of advances, but also obliga-
tions to account and report, which they are largely not fulfilling.On such 
grounds, this article argues that innovations in Cameroon’s tax policy and 
administration are being recast to fit local understandings through the ac-
tive involvement of business owners, tax officials, and local administrators. 
Clearly there needs to be a connection between what business operators 
are willing to make visible and what the state, through its agents, can actu-
ally “see.” Therefore, even piecemeal and imprecise idioms of documenta-
tion need to be accepted as the basis for business visibility. In the closing 
stages of the meeting between the Vina District state representatives and 
the cattle traders, the prefect declared that tax authorities had no choice 
but to “count on the traders’ honesty.” This seems to be the fate of state 
authorities regarding not only cattle trade but other sectors of activity in 
Adamaoua as well. Counting on business owners’ honesty—that is, taking 
their performances of visibility at face value—provides opportunities for fi-
nancial agreements between them and the tax officials. In these conditions, 
what meets the eye of the state becomes the object of negotiation. Neither 
“le maquis” nor its associated attribute of darkness would afford business 
people in Adamaoua a free ride.
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Notes
1.  The present article is based on fifteen months of fieldwork in several research 
trips between July 2003 and September 2005. It draws from participant observa-
tion and semistructured interviews with numerous state officials and more than 
ninety business owners working in Adamaoua Province.
2. This article shows, parenthetically, how notions such as the tax effort inspire the 
adoption of devices that assess the performance of state officials and provide 
the incentives for improvements. As a senior official writes with a touch of pride, 
“Within the Cameroonian administration as a whole, the Direction Générale 
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des Impôts [the national tax authority] is unique in having firmly and irre-
versibly embarked on the hazardous road to performance-based management” 
(Evina Obam 2005: 24). Indeed, as noted later, tax administration in Camer-
oon now relies on annual revenue targets, although as the preceding comment 
hints, the performance-based system of rewards and penalties remains opaque 
and affords decision-makers almost unlimited room for discretion. 
3. Karine Bennafla (2002) has provided what is to date the best-informed account 
of traders’ border crossings in the Central African region. For a suggestive 
but markedly different analytical use of the notion of population flottante, see 
Argenti (2007). 
4. Peter Geschiere’s argument that witchcraft and sorcery beliefs among the Maka 
of eastern Cameroon act both as theories of political and economic success 
and as methods of control over emerging social hierarchies is, notwithstanding 
the differences of both settings, relevant to present-day Adamaoua Province. 
In Adamaoua, Muslims and non-Muslims alike hold a great diversity of sorcery 
beliefs, which for the most part have lost their ethnic specificity, and they view 
sorcery techniques as potentially efficacious (Bocquené 2002:229–35; Burn-
ham 1996:58–60; Mahmoudou Djingui 2000).
5. On the colonial legacy in the domain of taxation in Francophone Africa, see 
Fotsing (1995). In her work on the area surrounding Kaélé (in what is today 
Far North Province), Patrice Pahimi (2003:33–34) has documented the admin-
istrative dilemmas that officials in charge of tax collection faced in the tran-
sition from the colonial to the postcolonial period.The postcolonial neglect 
of internal taxation was compatible with heavy tax pressure, sometimes in the 
shape of extortionate demands, on politically disenfranchised groups. As Burn-
ham (1996:103–5) vividly shows for the 1970s, this was particularly the case for 
Adamaoua’s pastoral Fulani, or Mbororo. Burnham’s work also emphasizes how 
taxpayers saw the head tax as an opportunity to assert identities that implied a 
higher status in the local hierarchies of value (1996:62–63). On these matters, 
see also Boutrais (1999).
6. This was the year of the CFA franc devaluation and the subsequent overhaul of 
the tax and customs regime in member states of the Central African Customs 
Union (UDEAC).
7. Despite their mediocre yields and regressive nature, these flat-rate taxes have 
been adopted in several other African countries (see Gautier et al. 2001). From 
an expert point of view, they are technical oddities because they tax both income 
and activity. On the replacement of the head tax by the impôt libératoire, see 
Finken (1996: 175–76). On the introduction and difficulties of implementation 
of the impôt libératoire in Cameroon’s South West Province, see Niger-Thomas 
(2000: 217–35).
  The adoption of the VAT illustrates the difficulties posed by these con-
stant reforms. In order to avoid the catastrophic drop in revenue figures that 
its introduction had provoked in African countries like Niger (see Barlow & 
Snyder 1994), the Cameroonian government in 1994 opted for a transitory tax 
on commercial turnover (taxe sur le chiffre d’affaires) to replace the old tax on 
internal commercial turnover (impôt sur le chiffre d’affaires intérieur). After four 
years of administrative confusion, including a failed attempt to privatize its col-
lection (Hibou 2004:15), this new TCA was then replaced by the VAT.
  The specialized taxation units are the Programme de Sécurisation des Rec-
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ettes Forestières (Décret no. 99/370/PM, March 19, 1999), the Programme de 
Sécurisation des Recettes de l’Elevage et de la Pêche (Decree no. 2000/980/
PM, Dec. 8, 2000), and a centralized unit based in Yaoundé dealing exclusively 
with large firms, the Division des Grandes Entreprises (Décret no. 2003/165, 
June 30, 2003).
  The revenue figures went from 540.7 billion in 1996/97 to 1,113.7 billion 
CFA francs in 2005 (source: Banque de France, Rapports Zone Franc, constant 
figures). Nonoil tax revenue as a percentage of nonoil GDP went from a dismal 
7.7 in 1993–94 to 10.1 in 1996–97 and 12.9 in 2000–2001 (Fambon 2006:9). In 
2003 nonoil revenue represented 13.1 percent of the GDP compared to oil rev-
enue, which reached only 4.5 percent of the GDP (IMF 2005:34). In 2006 Cam-
eroon’s ratio of tax revenue-to-GDP was 17 percent (IMF 2007). From 1998 to 
2000 the number of taxpaying persons and enterprises increased 169 percent, 
including a “spectacular” progression of people subject to the impôt liberatoire, 
from 64,182 to 168,419 (Monkam et al. 2003). It is necessary to remember that 
these figures on revenue and number of taxpayers leave out moneys and pay-
ers that fall within the realm of “unofficial taxation.” As Jane Guyer (1992:66) 
noted in her study of local taxation in Oyo State, Nigeria, “Private payments to 
public officials—to fend off the state rather than to tap it—constitute another 
set of contributions to governance that must average out to higher annual per 
capita expenditure than taxation and have a rather different sociology.” 
8. Roitman (2005: 68) gives a narrower interpretation of the use of this phrase as 
signifying tax collection.
9. The introduction of businesslike management rules is one of the New Public 
Management ideas (see, e.g., Manning 2001) that has had widest influence on 
the formulation of tax reform in developing countries, although actual poli-
cies and measures have often departed from such principles (see Fjeldstad & 
Moore 2009). In November 2004, during my fieldwork, the suspension of seven 
heads of tax centers in Yaoundé and Douala for performing below the set tar-
gets hit the national press headlines (see, e.g., Le Messager, Nov. 19, 2004). On 
the privatization of the state more generally, see Hibou 2004.
10. See Cameroon’s Tax Code, Articles 48 and 49.
11. The law regulating NGOs dates from late 1999 (Law 99/14, Dec. 22). The 
decree required to implement the law (décret d’application) was issued on May 3, 
2001. However, these legal provisions did not take effect until 2003. As of 2008, 
only nineteen organizations were officially recognized as NGOs nationwide 
(source: PASOC [Program for the Structuring of Civil Society in Cameroon]). 
12. Elyachar’s work (2005) in Cairo in the late 1990s shows how NGOs work not 
only as breeding grounds for young entrepreneurs but also as conduits for 
business operators to reconstitute their identity in order to capture financial 
opportunities and obtain tax benefits. 
13. On the role of youth during this conflict-ridden period, see Saïbou Issa (2006). 
The decision of the cattle traders to stop paying their licenses was a departure 
from the second half of the previous decade, when state revenue from Adamao-
ua’s cattle sector had increased significantly. In 1989, for example, the Ministry 
of Livestock’s provincial delegate could declare with pride that “Adamaoua has 
not ceased to make progress in the collection and transfer of taxes to state cof-
fers.” The official explanation for this improvement emphasized the impact of 
tighter market controls. Civil disobedience campaigns reversed that trend. See 
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Rapport Annuel 1988/89, Délégation Provinciale de l’Elevage de l’Adamaoua, (91); 
see also Rapport Annuel 1990/91 (88) (MINEPIA’s provincial archives, Ngaoun-
déré). Indeed, the Ministry’s revenue at the provincial level went from around 
42 million CFA francs in 1984–85 to over 145 million in 1989–90.
14. The impôt libératoire includes four different rates (categories A to D) depend-
ing on the kind of activity and annual turnover. According to their testimonies, 
traders got taxed at a more favorable rate in exchange for paying a few thou-
sand francs to the municipal officials on the side. At the time I was doing field-
work, for instance, some traders who shipped cattle to the south were paying 
this tax at a category B rate, instead of the category D that in theory applied to 
their situation.
15. One of the aspects that cattle traders resented most concerned the object of 
taxation. According to the Cameroonian Tax Code, commercial income tax 
should tax actual, and not potential, income. Tax advances should only be a 
percentage of the traders’ sales. Under the provisions of the ordinance, how-
ever, cattle on their way to final markets, which therefore had not yet been sold, 
are taxed. A portion of those cattle can be lost along the way as a result of theft, 
illness, or catastrophic market conditions. 
16. Béatrice Hibou (2004:7) has perceptively discussed the trend whereby govern-
ments delegate tax collection to big companies in the private sector, for the 
most part, foreign private firms. 
17. In 1994, as a result of conflicts over access to railway transport, Ngaoundéré’s 
cattle traders divided themselves into two main groups. The first one is linked 
to the national association and informally known as Le Comité (the commit-
tee). The second, created as a result of the 1994 split, is ELCOBCAM (Eleveurs 
et Commerçants à Bétail de Cameroun).
18. Vina, one of the five districts in Adamaoua Province, is the district in which the 
provincial capital, Ngaoundéré, is located.
19. The meeting’s other main “achievement” was to dramatize conflicts between 
different representatives of the state at the local level. Moments for direct inter-
action between the prefect and officials in the governmental agencies in charge 
of cattle and taxes are few and far between. The meeting allowed them to work 
out the limits of their respective authority. Interestingly, Vina’s cattle traders, 
despite their many internal conflicts, spoke with one voice.
20. At the time, the passing from the impôt libératoire to a license meant only an 
additional 35,000 francs. The impôt libératoire category B amounted to 21,000. 
The patente de base for cattle traders was normally set at 56,000. It is worth noting 
that if traders had been paying the impôt libératoire at the applicable rate (cat-
egory D), this would have ranged from 75,000 to 100,000 francs, more expen-
sive than the patente. The reason for this is that the impôt libératoire is a global 
tax that exempts one from other taxes, such as the VAT or the commercial 
income tax. The paradox is that in regard to cattle trade, such exonerations 
are not respected in practice. Under present arrangements the 1999 ordinance 
imposes a tax advance on the commercial income tax to anyone who transports 
cattle by train.
21. The elaboration of the 1987 census was itself marred by irregularities and its 
results were never fully published. Presidential Decree no. 2000/251 (Sept. 13, 
2001) ordered a new census to be conducted. While the information-gathering 
operations were completed by the end of 2005 with the assistance of interna-
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tional funding, publication of the census has been postponed on the grounds 
of technical deficiencies. Many commentators have interpreted these delays in 
terms of the political sensitivity of census data.
22. The partnership between the tax authorities and the Caisse Nationale de Pré-
voyance Sociale, the government body in charge of the social security system, 
was established in 2001 (Law no. 2001/017, Dec. 18, 2001). The setting up 
of a Cellule Mixte Impôts/Douanes (customs/taxes joint unit) had to wait 
until 2005. In 2007, however, in light of its failure to commence operation, the 
national Commission for Tax Reform proposed its elimination.
23. For a vivid testimony on the “privatization” of legal texts by the senior officials 
in Adamaoua’s treasury, see Achariyan Cameroun (1990:50–51).
24. Many traders think that they are mostly paying for crossing a threshold. Referred 
to simply as laissez-passer within professional circles, the veterinary inspection 
fees (and the written documents they generate) are perhaps the most obvious 
example of this. Other payments—such as the income tax advances I discuss 
here—might also be seen as ways of obtaining a pass. In another context, Bill 
Maurer has questioned the tendency to conflate monetary relationships with 
exchange relationships. His assertion that payments (of taxes, but also more 
broadly) are not exchanges draws our attention to the fact that “exchanges are 
shot through with other, nonexchange relationships” (2007:128–29). Taxation 
is a particularly productive field in which to explore this claim. Whereas most 
legal systems define taxes as imposing unambiguously nonreciprocal obliga-
tions to pay, public debates on taxation hinge largely on a purported contract 
between a state and its citizenry.
25. I thank Philip Burnham for insisting on these points. In a revealing example 
from 1969, the federal government’s inspector for northern Cameroon com-
plained about the objectionable effects of the formulas for the administration 
of the head tax that were in use at the time, which he saw as technically deficient 
(Archives Provinciales de Maroua, O. 1969, V,1.1, letter of June 23; included 
in Pahimi 2003:61, 115–17). On regroupement, see Burnham 1975. For a discus-
sion on the longevity of the head tax in the postcolonial era, see Fjeldstad and 
Therkildsen’s work on Uganda (2009). 
